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I.   INTRODUCTION 
Foreign direct investment (henceforth FDI) is an important component of capital flows in 
financial globalization. Though the vast literature lacks consensus on the benefits of financial 
globalization, FDI is believed to be one of the most important channels through which 
financial globalization benefits the economy (Prasad and others, 2003). Various studies find 
evidence in support of the benefits of a positive effect on growth via technology spillovers. 
FDI is also the least volatile form of capital flows, making countries less vulnerable to sudden 
stops or reversals of flows (Kose and others, 2006). Against this background, many countries 
consider attracting FDI as an important element for economic development. Thus, an 
important policy question is what are the factors that attract FDI.  
This paper attempts to answer the question with a special focus on the role of 
structural reforms. We construct a unique panel data set for 19 Latin American countries 
(LACs) and 25 transition economies (TEs) from 1989 to 2004.
1 Both regions—Latin America 
and transition economies— undertook massive structural reforms since the early 1990s. In 
many countries in both regions, financial markets were liberalized, trade barriers had been 
greatly reduced, and state-owned enterprises were privatized to a large extent. From a point of 
view of foreign investors, investment decisions in emerging markets are influenced by 
economic and political risks.  
Many believe that successful implementation of structural reforms by the host 
government is a positive signal to foreign investors as it implies less investment risk. Thus, 
                                                 
 
1  There are numerous papers examining FDI inflows in Latin American and in transition economies, 
separately. For Latin American countries see, among others, De Gregorio (1992), Trevino et al. 
(2002), and Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003). For transition economies, see among others, Bevan 
and Estrin (2000), Garibaldi at al (2001), and Resmini (2000).       
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the progress of structural reforms can be an impetus to strong foreign investment flows. We 
also argue that structural reforms go beyond being just a signal. They generate real benefits to 
foreign investors by affecting the key parameters upon which the decision to invest in a 
foreign country is taken.    
Despite its relevance, there exists little empirical study relating FDI flows and 
structural reforms. One of the main reasons for this is a paucity of the data comparable across 
countries and regions on structural reforms.
2 One main contribution of this paper is the 
construction of various structural reform indicators that are comparable across countries in 
more than one region and consistently defined over time.
3   
Another important reason for the relative paucity of research on this topic is the 
common misconception that the relation between FDI and structural reforms is axiomatic. In 
other words, one might argue “FDI is reform;” e.g., less restrictions to foreign capital imply 
more FDI inflows, and more privatization means more foreign investors are interested in 
entering domestic market through acquisition. This argument runs into trouble once we recall 
that structural reforms come in different shapes and forms. That is, the same reform in 
different countries may have opposite effects due to institutional differences. Also, a set of 
reforms may also have different joint effects because of their substitutability or 
complementarity, or because of sequencing issues.
4 
In constructing the data, we also try to isolate reform efforts from reform outcomes. 
                                                 
2 The existing studies on structural reform are mostly limited to industrial countries owing to data 
availability (e.g., Chapter III, WEO, April 2004).The notable exceptions are Abed and Davoodi (2000) 
and Lora (1998) for transition economies and Latin America countries, respectively.        
3 The structural reform variables consist of the following three components: financial sector 
liberalization, trade liberalization, and privatization. See Section IV for the definitions of the variables 
in detail. 
4 Dewatripont and Roland (1995) find that gradualist reform strategies as opposed to big-bang 
strategies may be more effective in attracting welfare-enhancing foreign investment in the presence of 
uncertainty.          
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Namely, regarding financial liberalization, we differentiate a set of measures that range from 
indicators of financial development (outcomes) to measures closer to the policy changes 
(efforts) of the government in this regard.
 5   
Using this newly constructed data, our principal finding from regression analyses is 
that of a strong relationship from structural reforms to FDI. Among the structural reforms 
considered in the study, we find a stronger effect on FDI from financial sector reforms than 
privatization and trade liberalization, suggesting that foreign investors do value highly a host 
country’s financial system that is able to allocate capital efficiently, monitor firms, ameliorate, 
diversify and share risk, and ultimately mobilize savings. These results give rise to a “paradox 
of finance:” why do multinational firms that are not clearly financially constrained 
systematically invest in countries in which such constraints are most relaxed? Our explanation 
is that financial development may be a precondition to the maximization of the benefits of 
spillovers via the backward linkages to foreign investors.   
It should be also noted that our finding on the relative importance of financial reforms 
on FDI additional support to the existing literature. For example, Alfaro and others (2004) 
examine the links among FDI, financial development, and economic growth and find that 
countries with better developed financial markets are able to exploit FDI more efficiently. 
They argue “the potential of FDI to create backward linkages in the absence of well-
developed financial markets is severely impeded” (Alfaro and others (2004), p. 92).  
Similarly, Prasad and others (2007) also argue that the absorptive capacity measured by 
financial development of the recipient country is a precondition to the benefits of foreign 
capital inflows to higher growth. 
                                                 
5 The analogy for trade liberalization is as follows: trade openness is a measure of reform outcome, 
while actual tariffs and their dispersion are a better measure of government reform efforts.       
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Our results support and extend those findings by suggesting that financial reform is 
not only more important than financial development but also financial reform is more 
important than other structural reforms.   
In addition to financial and privatization reforms, foreign investors are attracted to 
countries with more stable macroeconomic environment, higher levels of economic 
development, and infrastructure. We find that these results are robust to different measures of 
FDI, reform, different estimators, split samples, measurement error, endogeneity, and 
potential omitted variables bias.  
An important recent development in the literature is the incorporation of institutional 
quality in the modeling of the FDI location determinants. We also control for various aspects 
of institutional quality. Our regression results hold up well after the inclusion of institutional 
variables, which is in line with those put forward by Alfaro and others (2004), Bevan and 
others (2004), and Gastanaga and others (1998).
6  
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews a recent development in the two 
regions during the period. Section III describes in detail the construction of the structural 
reform variables used to examine the determinants of FDI. Section IV discusses the 
underlying theoretical framework on the determinants of FDI inflows in relation to the rest of 
the empirical literature. Section V reports our main econometric results and sensitivity checks. 
Section VI concludes the paper and outlines directions for future research. 
 
                                                 
6 Alfaro et al. (2004) present cross-sectional (long-term) results, while Bevan et al. (2004) focus only 
on the transition economies. Our paper differs from Gastanaga et al. (1998) in that we look at fewer 
reforms in fewer regions (although our samples are of approximately the same size) but we use 
measures of reform that try to separate reform inputs to reform outcomes and examine the effects of 
reform controlling for a richer set of standard determinants.  It is also noteworthy that Gastanaga et al. 
(1998) argue that panel results on the relationship between reform and FDI tend to differ significantly 
from those from pure cross-section analysis. We also find support for this notion in the sense that the 
results for our institutional measures tend to be much stronger in the cross-section than in the panel.       
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II.   FDI IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES AND LATIN AMERICA  
This section gives a brief overview of recent developments in the two regions (TEs and 
LACs) during the period  1989–2004.  
The transition from centrally planned to market economy started more or less 
simultaneously in nearly thirty countries with similar inherited institutions, initial conditions, 
and income levels.
  A number of centrally planned economies set out to implement economic 
and political reforms, choosing different strategies and ending up experiencing dramatically 
different outcomes in many areas, including FDI flows. The period of our analysis  for Latin 
America corresponds roughly to the one Krueger calls “a decade of disappointment.”
7 We 
think that this term also works well to describe the transition experience given that the latter is 
marked by an unexpectedly severe fall of per capita GDP.    
The collapse of the socialist and import-substitution systems somewhat coincided and 
provided myriad investment opportunities. Many of these economies were industrialized and 
could count on a relatively cheap yet educated workforce. FDI was perceived as an important 
catalyst for technological advancement necessary for making them competitive in the 
international market. Yet these high hopes for FDI contrast sharply with the reduced role 
governments in transition economies allowed for foreign investors during the privatization 
process (Hungary is an exception) as well as against the backdrop of disappointingly large 
falls in output per capita and of extended recessions (Campos and Coricelli, 2002). It can be  
seen in Figures 1 and 2 that TEs had received less FDI than LACs throughout the 1990s, 
reversing the trend only after 2002.  
                                                 
7 See ‘Forward’ in Singh and others (2005).      
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The 1990s in Latin America were a decade of intense structural reform as well (Singh 
et al. 2005). The first years of the decade saw the implementation of various major 
macroeconomic stabilization programs that were successful after much trial and error, with 
the notable exception of Brazil where stabilization  succeeded only in 1994 with Plano Real.  
Macroeconomic stability paved the way for the adoption, implementation, and 
deepening of important structural reforms. Aggressive programs of trade liberalization (e.g., 
Chile) were implemented, privatization programs were adopted, and the liberalization of labor 
and credit markets were pursued with different degrees of success across the region. The 
period is said to be disappointing because, although reforms were implemented in Latin 
America with more intensity than in most developing countries, the growth pay-offs turned 
out to be low and came accompanied by unexpected and severe financial crises (Singh, 
2006).
8   
As far as FDI inflows are concerned, early hopes have not thus far materialized. FDI 
inflows into LACs are larger than those of TEs during the 1990s (Figures 1 and 2) but they 
had come to a halt at the time of the Asian crisis.   
According to UNCTAD, LACs received about 10 percent of global FDI inflows 
between 1990 and 1994 while Asia received almost twice as much. In the second half of the 
1990s, the share of FDI into LACs had increased to about 12 per cent but it still falls far short 
of Asia, which accounts for 16 percent. Also, FDI inflows were disproportionately 
concentrated in a handful of countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.  
 
                                                 
8 Lora and others (2003) talk of “reform fatigue” as the region sees the disappointing effect of the 
reforms on growth after extensive pro-market reforms in the 1990s. For example, average yearly per 
capita GDP growth rate was only 2.1 percent in the 1990s compared with more than 3 percent for the 
1960s and 1970s.       
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III.   MODELING THE DETERMINANTS OF FDI   
A.   Brief overview of the literature 
The considerable theoretical work on the determinants of FDI   identifies ownership 
advantages, location advantages, and benefits of internalization as the main elements 
(Dunnings, 1974; Hymer, 1960; Caves, 1982). Past studies can be classified largely into two 
groups. One group focuses on an analysis of the determinants endogenous to the multinational 
investing firms such as the size of the firm and R&D intensity, and asks why a firm becomes 
a foreign investor. The other group examines factors exogenous to the investors, namely, such 
location advantages of the host country  as market size and labor cost.
 9 In the rest of the 
section we focus on the latter group as this paper examines the determinants of FDI that are 
exogenous to the investor but endogenous to the host country.   
What are the factors that attract FDI? The literature indicates that the key locational 
determinants are the classical sources of comparative advantages of the host country. Firms 
choose the investment site that minimizes the cost of production.
10 Notably, host country 
market size and relative factor prices (i.e., natural resources, labor cost, and human capital) all 
affect the expected profitability of foreign investment (Kravis and Lipsey, 1982).Wheeler and 
Mody (1992) find that infrastructure availability is particularly an important domestic country 
attribute for foreign investors in the U.S. Also, they find the past stock of foreign investment 
also important in explaining FDI inflows. The riskiness of investment in terms of economic 
and political environment also affects the expected return to the investment. In this respect, 
greater macroeconomic and political stability of the host country could attract more foreign 
investment (Bevan and Estrin, 2000).    It is also argued that FDI and trade openness can be 
                                                 
9 See Blonigen (2005) for a survey of the literature on FDI determinants. 
10 Wheeler and Mody (1992) provide a comprehensive summary of the classical sources of 
comparative advantages.       
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positively related as FDI flows can be considered complementary to trade flows (Caves, 1992; 
Singh and Jun, 1996).  
A number of recent works examine FDI to the TEs. Resmini (2000) and Bevan and 
Estrin (2000) examine the drivers for FDI into 11 transition countries in the pooled and panel 
settings, respectively. They put forward the notion that the prospect of European Union 
membership played an important role in attracting export-platform FDI.  Campos and 
Kinoshita (2003) also examine FDI determinants, expanding the set of host countries to 
25 transition countries in a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) framework and stressing 
the importance of institutions and natural resource abundance in foreign investors’ locational 
decision. More recently, Demekas and others (2005) try to explain FDI flows into 
Southeastern European countries by using the gravity equation. Garibaldi and others (2001) 
have also produced an important paper on FDI in TEs in which they examine the overall level 
as well as the composition of private capital flows. They find that FDI allocation across 
countries is well explained in terms of macroeconomic and initial condition variables.  
   The work on the determinants of FDI in Latin American countries is also vast. De 
Gregorio (1992) examines the impact of FDI on long-term growth in a large number of Latin 
American countries and finds that FDI is three to six times more efficient than total 
investment (1992, 93). Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003) find that the overall level of 
economic freedom, economic stability and the level of human capital are important 
determinant of FDI for subset of Latin American countries. More closely related to our study, 
Trevino and others (2002) examine the effects of three types of reforms—microeconomic, 
macroeconomic and institutional—on FDI inflows in seven Latin American countries 
between 1998 and 1999. They report that the most significant factors explaining FDI inflows 
are the level of GDP, privatization, and CPI inflation proxying macroeconomic stabilization.      
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B.   Econometric model  
This study draws on the existing literature on the determinants of cross-country FDI. 
Specifically, we test for three categories of the determinants. First, we look into traditional or 
classical factors such as market size, infrastructure, and macroeconomic environment. 
Second, we look at institutional factors. Third, we question whether the host country 
government’s structural reforms play a significant role in attracting foreign investors, 
especially in emerging economies.  
In our baseline model, we specify FDI as a function of three main groups of variables: 
a set of classical determinants of FDI, structural reforms, and institutional quality. The 
baseline econometric model is as follows:  
 
 
, it t i it
it it it
u
X Y
+ + =
+ =
γ η ε
ε λ
 (1) 
 
where Yit is the dependent variable which is measured as FDI as a ratio of GDP in country i at 
year t.
 11  Xit  includes (i) the classical factors (market size, initial income level, natural 
resource abundance, infrastructure, inflation), (ii) structural reform variables (overall financial 
market development, bank efficiency, trade liberalization, privatization),  and (iii) institutional 
variables (quality of bureaucracy, executive constraints, rule of law). 
12  In addition,  i η  
represents unobservable country-specific attributes and  t γ  is a vector of time-specific effects 
(e.g., time dummies).    
                                                 
11 Alternatively, we use the log of FDI per worker. The main reason for using FDI per worker is that, 
in developing countries, large informal sectors are not uncommon and they affect the official GDP 
figures. 
12 More details on the variables are found in the next section.      
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It is a well-known concern in the literature that some of the regressors may be 
potentially endogenous or predetermined in determining FDI flows. For example, FDI might 
be attracted to a country that has a more liberalized financial market but at the same time 
financial liberalization may be enhanced by the presence of FDI.  If we were to run the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on (1), the estimate would be biased as the error term 
is correlated with Xs.  
To address the potential endogeneity of regressors and to incorporate fixed effects, we 
employ the system-GMM estimator from Blundell and Bond (1998). The Blundell-Bond 
estimator is arguably a superior approach to the Arellano-Bond difference-GMM as adding 
lagged differenced variables as instruments in the level equations may generate substantial 
efficiency gains when the time window is relatively short.
13 Another advantage of the system-
GMM estimation is its ability to identify the coefficients of time-invariant variables in the 
level equation.   
System GMM also has advantages over the standard or difference IV estimates 
because as the length of the panel increases, so does the number of valid instruments. For 
equation (1), valid instruments are lagged levels of dependent variables,  s it Y −  where  2 ≥ s and 
. ,..., 4 , 3 T t =    If  it X  is strictly exogenous, then  s it X − ∆  (for all s) can be used as additional 
instruments to increase the efficiency of the estimates. The validity of instruments is checked 
by the Sargan test. The second-order correlation of the error term in the first-differenced 
equation is assessed using Arellano-Bond statistics for autocorrelation, which is 
asymptotically distributed as N(0,1). When the number of observations is small relative to 
                                                 
 
13 The difference-GMM estimator utilizes lagged levels as instruments in the difference equations 
(Arellano and bond, 1991), whereas the system-GMM estimator uses lagged differences as additional 
instruments in the level equations.        
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parameter estimates, we should be attentive to the possibility of small sample bias in the 
GMM estimation.   
The main reasons for foreign investors to choose a certain investment location can be 
explained by several motives such as market-seeking and resource-seeking (Lipsey, 2006).
 If 
FDI is market-seeking, then a large host country’s market size and high growth prospects can 
be the main drivers of FDI. If it is resource-seeking, FDI is drawn to the location endowed 
with abundant natural resources. To test for these different hypotheses, we include various 
classical determinants of FDI as the first set of explanatory variables.  
In order to test for these different hypotheses, we include various classical 
determinants of FDI as the first set of explanatory variables. Namely, we measure market size 
by log of GDP. If investment decisions are of market-seeking nature (i.e., sell in the local 
market), then we would expect this to be positive. Natural resources endowment may also be 
an important factor, particularly for resource-driven FDI. We use (log of) the percentage of 
fuel and natural gas in total exports as a proxy for natural resource dependence.
 Log GDP per 
capita captures the level of development across countries, which reflects among other things 
differences in initial conditions. Inflation is a standard proxy for macroeconomic stability.  
We expect a negative sign on the coefficient of (log) inflation as low inflation is 
perceived by foreign investors as a favorable signal and it should lead to more FDI. Sufficient 
infrastructure is another factor that allures foreign investors to a country. We use (log of) the 
number of main telephone lines as our infrastructure variable. Availability of main telephone 
lines is important to facilitate communication and help integrate the domestic market and, 
given that other important elements of the national infrastructure (for instance, internet 
services or computer usages) are often complementary to telephones lines, this variable      
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provides a useful proxy for the overall quality of infrastructure in the host country.
14 
A second set of explanatory variables includes those that are related to structural 
reforms: financial reform, trade liberalization, and privatization efforts. Recent literature of 
capital account liberalization argues that pre-commitment to structural reforms can encourage 
more stable and longer-term capital inflows to the host country (Forbes, 2006). In our view, 
these three are among the most important reforms that help bring in FDI to the host country. 
A third set of variables include various measures of institutional quality. A growing 
body of literature in economic growth emphasizes the role of good economic institutions in 
promoting higher investment, higher educational attainment, and lower mortality. In the 
context of FDI, institutions underpin local business operating conditions, but they differ from 
“physical” supporting factors such as transport and communication infrastructure. Consider, 
for instance, the context in which a fair, predictable, and expedient judiciary, an efficient 
bureaucracy and less corruption may help attract FDI. On the other hand, as the recent 
literature of international trade argues, institutional quality matters to the firm’s decision to 
choose FDI as a mode of entry as opposed to outsourcing because of the hold-up problem 
(Antras, 2003).
15 If this is indeed the case, poor institutional quality would encourage more 
FDI, ceteris paribus. Thus, the theories point to two possibilities regarding the role of 
institutions in affecting FDI inflows. Good institutions may increase or decrease FDI inflows 
depending on the sector and type of FDI the country receives. In the past, data limitations 
have impeded extensive testing of these ideas, constraining them to focus on just one aspect 
of the issue, normally corruption. In this paper, we examine an array of institutional features 
                                                 
14 For discussions of other infrastructure variables, see below. 
15 The hold-up problem arises when the firms’ necessary investments are relationship-specific and it is 
impossible ex-ante to write complete contracts covering all contingencies between the buyer and 
seller. In the absence of property right protection, a firm would prefer to engage in vertical integration 
rather than the arm’s length contracts with outside suppliers.       
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and try to assess their relative importance. The institutional quality variables used in this 
study are the rule of law, quality of bureaucracy, and executive constraints. 
 
 
IV.   DATA AND MEASUREMENT: FDI, STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND INSTITUTIONS 
In this section, we describe the data set we put together for this paper. Our data set covers 19 
Latin American and 25 transition economies from 1989 to 2004.
16  We describe the FDI 
measures, the indexes of financial reform, and of trade liberalization, the privatization index, 
and the various institutional measures (executive constraints, corruption, rule of law and 
quality of the bureaucracy), as well as the additional controlling variables (such as natural 
resources, infrastructure, and market size).   
 
A.   Foreign Direct Investment  
The data on foreign direct investment are from International Financial Statistics (IFS). These 
are balance of payments data reflecting capital inflows to acquire a lasting management 
interest in an enterpise operating in a different economy than that of the investor (where 
lasting interest is defined in standard fashion as acquiring at least 10 percent of total 
ownership).  
Figures 1 and 2 show FDI inflows over GDP and FDI inflows per worker, 
respectively. First, it is interesting to note that throughout the 1990s average FDI inflows 
(over GDP as well as per worker) to LACs tend to be substantially larger than to transition 
economies, with this reversing only for two years of our whole period of analysis. For the 
                                                 
16 The Latin American countries (LACs) are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, México, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Perú, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Trinidad and Tobago; while the Transition economies (TEs) 
are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, 
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.      
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years up to the East Asian crisis, the behavior of the two series in the two regions is similar, 
both showing a rapid increase in FDI inflows. The East Asia crisis of 1997 quickly spilled 
over to Brazil and Russia (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000) but has acquired different dynamics 
depending on the region: Figures 1 and 2 show that, in Latin America, FDI inflows come to a 
halt and have yet to recover in GDP terms although they did recover in 2004 in per worker 
terms (Calvo, 2003), while for the transition economies these effects seem milder with FDI 
inflows recovering two years after the crisis. The relatively small dip in 2002 in Latin 
America coincides with the Argentinean Crisis.  
 
B.   Measures of Structural Reform  
Investment decisions in emerging markets are often influenced by economic and political 
risks. Successful implementation of economic reform by the host government provides a 
positive signal to investors, as progress toward a stable macroeconomic environment implies 
less investment risk and uncertainty.  Our goal is to construct measures that are comparable 
across regions and over time. The data requirements are high: we need yearly data for a panel 
of countries from two different regions on a number of reform variables that, for 
comparability purposes, should ideally come from the same source.
17 In light of these 
requirements, we decided to focus on three reform areas: financial sector reform, 
privatization, and trade liberalization.
18 
                                                 
17 Notice this rules out a number of options, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (EBRD) and Inter-American Development Bank Annual reports.   
18 We started out with the following set of reforms in mind: financial sector reform, privatization, trade 
liberalization, tax reform, labor market reform, and changes in the regulatory framework (the latter, 
along the lines of the World Bank’s Doing Business project). Yet, data availability forced us to focus 
only on these three reforms.      
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Another important concern in constructing these reform measures is to try not to 
confuse reform efforts with reform outcomes.
19 For instance, in discussions of trade 
liberalization reform efforts based upon indicators of trade openness are common. Yet 
improvements in trade openness can be generated by myriad of reasons other than attendant 
changes in trade policy (for instance, it can be driven by exchange rate movements, 
technological change, climate shocks, and unilateral changes in trade policy stances of major 
trading partners). A similar case can be made for privatization and financial reform. Consider 
the use of the share of private sector in GDP for the former, and the use of proxies for 
financial development in the latter. With this concern in mind, we put forward the notion that 
one of the main advantages of our reform indexes is that they explicitly try to isolate the effect 
of reform efforts from that of reform outcomes, and mostly capture the former. As mentioned, 
our overall financial reform index and our stock-market development measure are not input-
only measures of reform.  
One could argue that this is not the case with respect to our index of the efficiency of 
financial intermediation. In order to attend this issue, we also use a more detailed set of policy 
reform variables drawn from Detriagiache and others (2007).  By so doing, we can test if 
policy changes rather than possible reform outcomes affect FDI inflows.        
 
Financial sector development and reform 
 
We construct several indicators for financial sector reform.
20 The source of our data is the 
recently updated (February 2006 version) World Bank’s Financial Structure Dataset (Beck et 
al., 2000).
21 This data set has been widely used in the financial liberalization literature as a 
                                                 
19 Rodrik (2005) and Loayza and Soto (2004) also make this important point. 
20 We also constructed another measure of financial liberalization based on stock capitalization, which 
was not used in the regressions. 
21 Available at http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/tbeck      
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main source for financial reform indicators. The first indicator reflects overall financial 
development and the second reflects the efficiency of the banking sector.  Notice that only the 
second indicator corresponds to reform efforts (inputs), while the first one is better at 
capturing overall reform outcomes. This should help us investigate how important it actually 
is to try to differentiate between inputs and outcomes.
22 
The three underlying variables for the first financial reform index are the ratio of 
liquid liabilities to GDP, based on the liquid liabilities of the financial system (currency plus 
demand and interest-bearing liabilities of bank and non-bank financial intermediaries); the 
ratio to GDP of credit issued to the private sector by banks and other financial intermediaries; 
and the ratio of commercial bank assets to the sum of commercial bank assets and central 
bank assets. We generated two versions of this index: one is an arithmetic average of the 
normalized values (more details shown below) of these three variables, and the second is 
based solely on the ratio of commercial bank assets to the sum of commercial bank assets and 
central bank assets.  
In order to normalize our reform measures into indices that reflect the strengthening of 
the operation of the market, we use the procedure suggested by Lora (1998), which involves 
subtracting each value from the series maximum and dividing this by the series range 
(maximum minus minimum value) which yields values between 0 and 1 scale (with 
1 indicating the maximum in-sample level of reform):  
 
                                                 
22 These two indexes are also helpful in distilling different interpretations of the effects of financial 
reform. The underdevelopment of financial markets may encourage FDI inflows in search of 
monopoly power, or financial market deregulations may be taken as a credible signal of a host 
government committed to economic reforms (e.g.,  multinational firms seldom depend on the host 
country’s financial markets to raise finance). In the next section, we report that the second index is 
significant suggesting more weight should be given to the second explanation.      
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where V is a value of j-th variable in i-th country in time t, n stands for the number of the 
years and m for the number of variables.  One main advantage of such transformation is that it 
allows our reform series to be measured over the same scale. Another advantage is that the 
reference point is the maximum in-sample value that changes over time (that is, it is not 
bound from above and does not refer to some idealized perfectly functioning market 
economy). Notice we apply this normalization to all of our reform indexes below.   
Our second index of financial reform measures the efficiency of financial 
intermediation and it is built upon two variables: the ratio of overhead costs to total bank 
assets and the “net interest margin,” which equals the difference between bank interest 
income and interest expenses, divided by total assets. Because larger values of these two 
variables are associated with a more inefficient financial sector, we adjusted the normalization 
above (in the numerator we subtracts the actual value from the minimum instead), so that the 
resulting figures read in tandem with our other reform indicators (larger values indicating 
more efficient financial intermediation).
 23 
Figures 3 and 4 show these financial reform indexes over time for the two regions. As 
expected, they reveal different aspects of financial reform. From Figure 3, financial reform as 
overall financial development was relatively more intense in the transition economies than in 
Latin America from 1989 to the mid-1990s, with the situation reversing after that (except for 
                                                 
23 We also generate a third index of financial reform measuring of the level of stock-market based 
financial development (as opposed to the more traditional, bank-based indicator described above). 
This index was constructed upon three variables: (a) the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP, 
(b) the total value traded: the ratio of trades in domestic shares (on domestic exchanges) to GDP, and 
(c) the turnover ratio, which is the ratio of trades in domestic shares to market capitalization. As the 
results turn out to be similar to the ones for the first financial development index, we refrain from 
reporting them for the sake of space.       
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the post 2001 years). Regarding our indicator of the efficiency of the financial sector, Figure 4 
shows that the transition economies were catching up with their Latin American counterparts 
until at least the middle of the decade, and after that point our index reveals that average 
efficiency in financial systems in transition economies surpasses those in Latin America.  
 
Trade liberalization 
 
The relationship between trade liberalization and FDI inflows is less straightforward. If trade 
flows are complements to FDI flows,
24 then we should expect more FDI should be attracted to 
the countries with more liberalized trade regimes. On the other hand, if FDI is basically 
intended for tariff-jumping purposes, more restrictive trade regimes may be able to attract 
more FDI.  
To measure the extent of trade liberalization, we construct an index based on two 
variables: average tariff rates and tariff dispersion. We use data from the World Bank-
UNCTAD’s WITS system, for about 6,000 HS-6 digit product groups to calculate the trade-
weighted average tariff and standard deviations yearly and for each of the 44 countries in our 
sample.
25 
However, the drawback of using UNCTAD data is that we are faced with missing 
information for LACs for more recent years and for TEs for earlier years. To remedy this, we 
use also two supplementary data sources, Lora (2001) and the Heritage Foundation’s 
Economic Freedom of the World project (Gwartney, Lawson, and Samida, 2000).
26 Once 
                                                 
24 See Caves (1996) and Singh and Jun (1996) for complementarity between trade and FDI.   
25 It is noted that in the literature there exists much controversy regarding the construction of indexes 
of the restrictiveness of trade policy (Kee and others, 2006; Rodrik and Rodriguez, 2002). That said, in 
light of our data requirements, we choose to follow other studies in which trade reform is measured in 
this way and compared with other structural reforms. 
26 Lora (2001) covers the Latin American countries until 2000 and the Heritage Foundation’s 
Economic Freedom of the World project covers most of the countries in our sample for years 1985, 
(continued…)      
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these were obtained, we applied the normalization above and took the arithmetic average of 
the two variables to generate an overall trade reform indicator.   
Figure 5 shows the behavior of trade liberalization efforts over time. As it can be seen, 
our measure suggests that this dynamics was similar in the two regions over this time period, 
showing an almost continuous process of successive reduction of tariff levels as well as of 
their dispersion. Despite the very high levels of reform attained in the two regions, our 
indexes suggest that the extent of trade openness in LACs has gone somewhat further than 
that in TEs.   
 
Privatization 
 
The measure of privatization reform efforts is based on recently constructed data on 
privatization proceeds by the World Bank (Kikeri and Kolo, 2005). This provides detailed 
information on all privatization transactions across developing countries between 1990 and 
2003. Privatization proceeds are defined as “all monetary receipts to the government resulting 
from partial and full divestitures (via asset sales or sale of shares), concessions, leases, and 
other arrangements” (2005, p.2). Notice that this excludes management contracts, new green-
field investments, and investments committed by new private operators as part of concession 
agreements.  
More important, note that these data also do not reflect “voucher” privatization 
programs as these methods tend to generate little revenues for the government. Although this 
biases our privatization index downward, we note that there are few Eastern European 
countries that carried out extensive voucher privatization programs (notably, Czech Republic 
                                                                                                                                                          
1990, 1995, 2000, and yearly after 2000. Both data measure trade reform as a combination of average 
tariff levels and tariff dispersion across a large number of products and/or sectors. 
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and Russia) and further that the choice of privatization methods has changed over time. In 
Russia, for example, voucher privatization was followed in the mid-1990s by the loans-for-
shares scheme which was abandoned in late 1990s in favor of a case-by-case privatization 
program (see, e.g., Bennett et al., 2004).  On this basis, we believe this bias is not severe 
enough to discard this comprehensive and internationally comparable source.
27 
The privatization index results from aggregating privatization proceeds from the 
World Bank data for every country in our sample country per year, and applying the 
normalization described above.  
Figure 6 shows these figures over time for the two regions. Note that: (a) with the 
exception of 1996 and 1997, our index suggests that privatization efforts were broadly 
comparable across the two regions, (b) somewhat surprisingly privatization efforts were more 
intense in Latin America than in Eastern Europe in the first half of the 1990s, (c) privatization 
efforts as measured by proceeds are more volatile in LACs than in TEs, and (d) there is a 
noticeable slow down of privatization activity after 1998 in the two regions but particularly in 
Latin America (Kikeri and Kolo, 2005).   
 
C.    Institutions  
Host country institutions also influence investment decisions because they directly affect 
business operating conditions. The cost of investment consists of not only economic costs but 
also non-economic costs such as bribery and time lost in dealing with bureaucracy and local 
authorities. To assess the institutional aspects of business operation conditions in the host 
                                                 
27 Available at http://rru.worldbank.org/Privatization/. As noted, our data set also contains information 
on whether or not the buyer is foreigner (company, individual, or consortium). Thus, we also construct 
a data series of government revenues from privatization that exclude all those transactions with a 
foreign buyer. All our main results below remain (including that for the role of privatization), which 
suggest that the link between reform (in this case privatization) and FDI inflows is not spurious in this 
sense.        
  21
country, we use two main data sources: Polity IV and the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG).
28  
From Polity IV, we use the extent of constraints on the executive power and the actual 
number of years the current regime has been in power (xconst and durable, respectively in the 
original sources). These measures have been used widely in the economics literature (e.g., 
Acemoglu and others, 2001).  
From the ICRG, we use the indexes of quality of the bureaucracy and the rule of law.
29 
These measures have also been used extensively in the economics literature (Gelos and Wei, 
2005). The former is a 1 to 4 indicator reflecting the “autonomy from political pressure, 
institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy” with higher ratings indicating a better 
bureaucracy along these lines. Also note that this measure is somewhat close to the corruption 
measure used by Wei (2000a, 2000b).  High values for this variable implies good quality of 
bureaucracy and, thus, a lower cost for foreign investors as an honest government with 
transparent regulations is probably less likely to ask for bribes and side payments.  
The indicator for the rule of law is coded from 1 to 6 with higher ratings reflecting the 
effectiveness of the legal system.
30 A higher score in the rule of law implies better legal 
institutions. We expect that countries with better legal infrastructure will be able to attract 
more FDI. 
                                                 
28 Available at  http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/ and   http://www.icrgonline.com/, 
respectively. 
29 Notice that below we do not report results on durable from Polity IV for the sake of space. We have 
assessed other institutional dimensions from ICRG, such as their measure of corruption, of 
government stability, and of political and economic risks, but for space reasons also do not discuss 
these results as they are similar to the ones we report. 
30 It is originally called “law and order” in ICRG. The "law" sub-component assesses the strength and 
impartiality of the legal system and the "order" sub-component assesses popular observance of the 
law. Each sub-component equals half of the total.      
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Not surprisingly, executive constraints seem to have been more effective in LACs than 
in TEs throughout the period of analysis. LACs’ average is closer to the maximum category 
(which is seven) and indicates almost perfect parity of the executive with other legislative and 
judiciary power while the average for TEs is somewhat lower indicating only “substantial 
limitations on executive authority.” The rapid implementation of political reforms in TEs can 
be seen by the imposition of constraints on the executives which was virtually unconstrained 
under communism. This is reflected in our data in its brisk change between 1989 and 1990 for 
this region.  
Regarding rule of law, TEs score better than LACs throughout our period of analysis. 
In both regions, we see a slight improvement in this regard between 1992 and 1998 but the 
values at the end of the period return to their 1989 levels. Finally, the ICRG’s quality of the 
bureaucracy generates a slightly different picture. Although TEs seem to have better 
bureaucracies than LACs before 1997, from 1998 onwards these indexes overlap. This 
arguably reflects, on the one hand, successful public sector reforms in Latin America and cuts 
in government expenditures in transition economies. The lesson we take from these three 
series is that different dimensions of institutional development behave differently not only 
across regions but also over time.
31  
 
D.   Other Control Variables 
In addition to newly constructed variables, we also control for more traditional FDI 
determinants: market size, the level of development, macroeconomic stability, infrastructure, 
and natural resource abundance.  
                                                 
31 Appendix Tables 1 and 2 report summary statistics and the correlation matrix, respectively. As it 
can be clearly seen from the latter, the correlations among our institutional variables are low.         
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Depending on the motives for investment, investors value one factor over the other. 
For example, market-seeking investors will be attracted to a country with a large and fast-
growing local market. Resource-seeking investors will favor a country with abundant natural 
resources, everything else constant. Efficiency-seeking investors will weigh more heavily 
geographical proximity to the home country, to minimize transportation costs.
32 
Market-seeking FDI is mostly to serve the host country market. Market size is a 
measure of the size of potential demand in the host country. We expect FDI inflows (per 
worker and over GDP) to be greater in countries with larger domestic markets. For a proxy 
market size, we follow the literature and use Gross Domestic Product (in PPP terms), while 
the level of development is proxied by the level of real per capita GDP. The source of these 
two series is the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) database.  
One indicator of a stable macroeconomic environment is price stability. Low inflation 
and prudent fiscal policies signal to investors the extent of government commitment and 
credibility. To proxy for stability, we use annual average inflation rates from WEO. Many 
transition and Latin American countries experienced high inflation after liberalizing prices in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. Those countries that embarked on stabilization programs 
succeeded in bringing inflation under control rapidly. In this light, the lower the average 
inflation rate is in the host country, the more successful was the stabilization program and the 
faster GDP growth returned. Thus, we expect that foreign investment, ceteris paribus, will be 
attracted to countries with lower inflation rates.  
Also from WEO, we construct a measure of natural resources dependence which is the 
percentage of oil and natural gas in total exports. Countries that are natural resources 
abundant may attract foreign investment in those industries, possibly diverting investment 
                                                 
32 See Campos and Kinoshita (2002).      
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from the manufacturing sector.
33   
Good infrastructure is an important factor for foreign investors to operate successfully, 
regardless of the type of FDI.  Availability of main telephone lines is necessary to facilitate 
communication and we draw this information from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators (WDI).
34  
 
 
V.   THE RESULTS 
The objective of this section is to identify what factors explain the distribution of FDI across 
Latin American and transition economies for the period of 1989–2004. The novelty of our 
study is to explicitly introduce structural reforms as determinants of FDI. We argue that the 
omission of such factors may bias existing results.  
 
A.   Baseline results 
Table 1 reports the regression results from the system-GMM due to Blundell and Bond 
(1998).
35  The dependent variable is the ratio of FDI to GDP. Two specification tests—the 
Sargan test and the second-order correlation (SOC) test for the validity of instruments—are 
reported in the last two rows of each column.     
As shown in columns 1 and 2, the results on the classical determinants of FDI are 
mostly consistent with the existing literature. Higher level of per capita income, stable 
                                                 
33 Gyfason and Zoega (2001) find that abundant natural resources may crowd out physical capital and 
inhibit economic growth. See also Robinson, Torvik, and Verdier (2002).  
34 One alternative for the infrastructure variable is the percentage of paved roads in the country. But 
this variable can be misleading in developing countries: if there is one main road in the country and it 
is paved, then the value for this will be 100. Thus, large values may not necessarily indicate better 
infrastructure.      
35 We used all lagged values of the explanatory variables as instruments (in levels for the first 
difference equations and in differences for the level equation). The assumption of weak exogeneity for 
all variables is not rejected by the Sargan over-identification tests while the strict exogeneity of the 
same variables was rejected.                
  25
macroeconomic environment reflected in low inflation, and sufficient infrastructure are 
positively related to FDI inflows. Resource abundance is another driver for FDI inflows in the 
region as seen in a positive and significant coefficient on log(fuel). However, it is important to 
note that market size proxied by log(GDP) fails to bear statistical significance and carries a 
negative sign. This implies that affiliate production in the host country is not necessarily 
intended for local sale but rather for export-platform. This is consistent with the findings in 
recent studies that vertical FDI is becoming more common than horizontal FDI. 
36 
Alternatively, it might be the case that foreign investors are in search of monopoly power 
(Detragiache and others, 2005) and that they do not care about the domestic market size. 
In columns 4 through 7, we include structural reform variables. What is striking is the 
significance and relative magnitude of financial reform measured as bank efficiency as well as 
privatization. Note that the sizes of the coefficients of four types of structural reform are 
comparable as they are all normalized to one. In column 5, for example, the coefficient of 
bank efficiency is about three times as large as that of privatization indicating that financial 
development measured by bank efficiency is more important than the progress toward 
privatization on foreign investment decisions. Both the Sargan and SOC tests show that 
instruments are valid throughout the regressions.    
The importance of a well-developed financial market is often cited as one of the 
prerequisites for economic growth. Tackling the financial globalization–growth puzzle, 
Prasad and others (2007) argue that foreign capital inflows including FDI can boost growth 
only when the recipient countries’ financial markets are developed enough to channel foreign 
capital efficiently to finance productive investment. Alfaro and others (2004) report a similar 
                                                 
36 Hanson and others (2001) and Grossman and Helpman (2003).      
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finding for FDI that well-developed financial markets for a pooled are a precondition for the 
positive effects of FDI on economic development. 
At the same time, this finding gives rise to a “paradox of finance” in the context of 
FDI. Why do multinational firms that are not clearly financially constrained systematically 
invest in countries in which such constraints are most relaxed?  
In the closely related literature on FDI spillovers, recent studies find that FDI can 
generate spillovers mainly through intra-industry backward linkages rather than inter-industry 
horizontal linkages: the productivity of foreign firms can be increased by having efficient 
domestic suppliers in the upstream.
37 In the current context, we could argue that foreign 
investors care about the efficiency of domestic financial market for its indirect benefit even if 
they do not raise capital locally. When the country has well-developed financial markets, it is 
more likely that local suppliers can invest in upgrading technology and machinery to provide 
better inputs. Thus, financial market development can be a good signal for the availability of 
potentially good suppliers.    
Our results also show that privatization is other important structural reform that affects 
FDI inflows as shown in columns 5 through 7. Privatization measure is based on information 
from all privatization transactions above US$ 50,000. That is, it contains the data on total 
revenues that privatized enterprise generated for the government per year. One concern is that 
the relationship we uncover is spurious because most of the privatizations that took place in 
these emerging economies comprise the selling of state owned enterprises to foreigners.
 Our 
data set also contains information on whether or not the buyer is foreign-origin. We construct 
an additional data series of government revenues from privatization that exclude all those 
                                                 
37 Among others, see Smarzynska (2004), Gorodnichenko, Svejnar and Terrell (2007) and Lin and 
Saggi (2007).        
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transactions with a foreign buyer. All our main results remain (including that for the role of 
privatization), which suggests that the link between greater private sector involvement (e.g., 
privatization) and FDI inflows is not spurious in this sense.
38  
As noted earlier, Russia and the Czech Republic were heavily reliant on vouchers and, 
thus, they received little privatization revenues. To differentiate voucher privatization, we also 
run the regressions excluding Russia and the Czech Republic. The results are, however, 
insensitive to the exclusion of the two countries.   
For institutional quality, quality of bureaucracy consistently has a positive impact on 
FDI inflows for all countries while its statistical significance diminishes for the region-wise 
regressions shown in columns 6 and 7. The coefficients of executive constraints and rule of 
law are positive as expected, although they often fail to bear statistical significance. It is worth 
noting that rule of law is quite important for LACs (column 6), while quality of bureaucracy 
is the most important institutional quality for foreign direct investors in TEs (column 7). 
39 
It is noteworthy that the difference between LACs and TEs is seen in trade 
liberalization. The progress of trade liberalization is an impetus to FDI inflows only in LACs, 
but not in TEs.    
 
B.   Decomposition of the financial sector reform   
The previous table shows that an efficient banking sector helps the country attract more FDI 
inflows. One might argue that the indicators of financial sector reform—overall financial 
development and bank efficiency—reflect the level of financial development rather than 
                                                 
38 We also find no evidence of Granger-causality between our privatization index and FDI inflows 
(over GDP or per worker). These results are also available from the authors upon request. 
39 Fan and others (2007) report that FDI inflows correlates with various institutional variables similar 
to ours— executive constraints, rule of law, and government’s good track record.          
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reform efforts. Thus, our results might simply indicate that FDI is attracted to the country 
with a financial market that had been already well-developed.  
In order to test if reform efforts encourage more FDI inflows rather than reform 
outcomes (e.g., the current level of financial development), we report in Table 2 with other 
variables of financial sector reforms from the alternative data source.
40 One drawback is that 
we lose quite a few observations. Nevertheless, this would serve us a robustness check on the 
importance of structural reforms in the financial sector in explaining FDI inflows. 
Eight additional financial reform variables are shaded in gray. The definitions of these 
variables are found in Appendix 2.  Financial liberalization index is constructed as an overall 
average of seven financial reform variables. We also include overall financial development to 
control for the current level of financial sector development.  
Columns 1 to 7 report the coefficients on each component of the financial reform 
variables when included separately in the regressions. They report that the ones that are 
associated with higher FDI inflows are supervision, creditceilings, and secruitiesmarkets. 
That is, FDI is attracted to a country with fewer restrictions on the expansion of bank credits, 
well-supervised banking sector, and more liberalized securities markets.    
Columns 8 to 10 report the results when we include financial liberalization index (the 
composite of all financial reform variables). For all countries, financial liberalization index is 
positive and significant. The same result holds for TEs. However, financial liberalization 
index is no longer important for LACs. We also tried with each of the financial reform 
variables for LACs but they fail to bear statistical significance.
41 For LACs, not financial 
sector reforms but privatization is a driving force behind FDI inflows.  
                                                 
40 Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2007) “A New Database of Financial Reforms”. 
41 Results available upon request.      
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In sum, the efforts of developing a well-functioning financial sector do indeed 
encourage more FDI inflows even after controlling for the current level of financial 
development: the progress in structural reforms in the financial sector can send a good signal 
to foreign investors even if the financial market is not yet deep.  
We found from the above result that financial sector reforms are an important driver 
for FDI.   One important concern regarding this result is the possibility of reverse causality. 
Does FDI promote the efficiency of the financial sector? Or is it that FDI is attracted by an 
efficient financial sector? If foreign banks are generally more efficient than domestic banks, 
the entry of foreign banks can be responsible for an improvement in financial sector 
efficiency and foreign direct investment.  
Our strategy is to collect additional information on the share of foreign ownership in 
the financial sector and run split-sample regressions to check whether such variation does 
affect our results. Although we cannot distinguish FDI inflows in the financial sector and in 
the non-financial sector, we have the data on the share of foreign ownership in the financial 
sector. 
42  
In Table 3, we divided the sample into two subgroups, nonfinancial FDI and financial 
FDI. If the observation has a major foreign share (greater than 20 percent), then it is classified 
as financialFDI. If a foreign share is less than 20 percent, it is grouped as nonfinancial FDI.
43 
The results in the first two columns in Table 3 show that, for all countries, financial 
liberalization index remains to be significant only for the countries with large foreign 
                                                 
 
42 Data were drawn from BankScope.  
43 We also conducted the Granger-causality tests in order to deal with the endogeneity. The tests show 
that financial reforms drive FDI inflows but not the other way around. We also did the standard IV 
estimation by using a number of de jure financial reform indexes taken from Abiad and others (2007) 
and found that bank efficiency remains significant in the IV results. These results are available from 
the authors upon request.      
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presence in the financial sector. Together with the insignificance of overall financial 
development, it implies that the policies to liberalize the financial markets rather than the level 
of financial development are more important for FDI inflows particularly when the country 
receives much FDI in the financial sector. In region-wise regressions, the difference between 
nonfinancial and financial FDI disappears both for LACs and TEs. Only for TEs, financial 
liberalization efforts positively influence FDI inflows. However, we need caution in 
interpreting the region-wise results as they can be due to insufficient number of observations.   
 
C.   Robustness checks  
So far we find that institutional qualities have a limited impact on FDI inflows in the data. 
Namely, the quality of bureaucracy seems to play a role in attracting FDI for all countries 
while rule of law is important only for LACs.  As it is well-known that the institutional 
variables tend to be closely related with one another, the inclusion of all institution variables 
at once might make it difficult to see which institutional attribute is more important.
44 
Table 4 reports results with the institutional variables included one at a time to address 
this issue. In addition, we include other institutional variables such as corruption, political 
risk, and indicator of polity durability. The aspects of institutional qualities that are closely 
related to FDI inflows are bureaucracy and executive constraints. Durability is another 
important factor. Rule of law remains statistically insignificant (column 3). We did the same 
sensitivity analysis for both region groups, LACs and TEs. Again, the baseline results remain 
robust. In LACs, rule of law is the only institutional variable that matters. In TEs, the quality 
of bureaucracy is the only variable with significance.  
                                                 
44 The correlation coefficients among institutional variables are not so large. See Appendix 2.       
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Another sensitivity analysis is carried out for the infrastructure variable in Table 5.  In 
the baseline regressions, we use the number of main telephone lines as a proxy for 
communication technology. One might argue that fixed telephone lines lose its importance for 
countries that are modernized enough to take advantage of cellular networks. Though we do 
not have that information in the data, alternatively, we use the number of computers per 1000 
people. Table 5 shows that the main results hold by replacing telephone lines with computers: 
the country with sufficient provisions of infrastructure attracts FDI. 
45  
In sum, our main findings on structural reforms and institutions withstand robustness 
tests. We find that the efficiency of the banking sector and privatization are two areas of 
structural reforms important for FDI investors. Good institutions also play a role via the 
quality of bureaucracy and rule of law for TEs and LACs, respectively.  
 
 
VI.   CONCLUSIONS 
Since the late 1980s, structural reforms have been implemented in unparalleled scale across 
the developing world while foreign direct investment (FDI) became one of the main 
components of private capital flows. The literature has not yet fully investigated their 
relationship in large part because of the lack of measures of structural reforms comparable 
over time and across regions. More recently, the literature has given weight to the 
identification of possible channels through which FDI may be made more effective such as a 
minimum threshold level of absorptive capacity such as human capital in the host country 
(Borensztein et al., 1998).  The implementation of structural reforms can work in similar way 
as structural reforms can improve business conditions and the investment climate.  
                                                 
45 We also included the uses of internet as a proxy for infrastructure but the number of observations 
drops significantly due to missing observations.  Results available upon request.      
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In this paper we construct the new data set on structural reform indices for 19 Latin 
American and 25 transition economies from 1989 to 2003. We go beyond the identification of 
the effects of selective individual reforms and try to provide a more comprehensive 
assessment of these links by asking which reforms matter vis-à-vis FDI and whether the 
effects of reform efforts differ in systematic ways from reform outcomes as well as from other 
standard FDI determinants.   
Our main finding from the regression analyses is a robust empirical relationship from 
structural reforms to FDI. Also, we find a stronger effect from financial sector reforms and 
privatization than from trade liberalization. When we had measures of both reform efforts and 
reform outcomes (e.g., financial reform), we find that the effect of reform outcomes is fragile 
(in terms of the overall degree of financial development), while that of reform efforts tend to 
be more powerful.  We conclude that this set of determinants of FDI inflows—financial 
reform, privatization, level of development and quality of the infrastructure—is robust to 
different measures of reform, different estimators, split samples, and potential endogeneity 
and omitted variables biases.  
We highlight three extensions of our study. First, one could further extend the analysis 
to re-investigate the long-term implications of FDI on growth after taking into account 
structural reforms. In particular, our findings point to the direction that financial sector reform 
may be a key factor in enhancing the benefits of foreign capital inflows. Second, it would be 
interesting to assess whether our findings hold as well for developed and for other groups of 
developing countries (Africa, Middle East and Asia), although this would require a substantial 
data collection effort. Third, as previously mentioned, the choice of structural reforms can be 
extended to have a broader coverage such as labor market and product market liberalization, 
tax policy, as well as changes in the regulatory framework.       
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Figure 1. Foreign Direct Investment Inflows over GDP, 
Latin American and Transition Economies, 1989–2004 
(both in constant US$ billions) 
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Figure 2. Foreign Direct Investment Inflows per Worker,  
Latin American and Transition Economies, 1989–2004  
(in constant US$ billions) 
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Figure 3. Overall Financial Reform Index  
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Figure 4. Index of Efficiency of Financial Intermediation 
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Figure 5. Trade Liberalization Index 
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Figure 6. Privatization Index 
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Table 1. Determinants of FDI: Baseline Model  
 
1234567
ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL LAC TE
log(GDP) -0.167*** -0.515*** -0.432*** -0.413*** -0.383*** -1.161*** -0.622***
[0.041] [0.096] [0.097] [0.098] [0.096] [0.17] [0.17]
log(GDP per capita) 0.499*** 0.473*** 0.271*** 0.285*** 0.218** -0.269** 0.17
[0.075] [0.073] [0.089] [0.093] [0.090] [0.13] [0.19]
log(inflation) -0.237*** -0.176*** -0.180*** -0.139*** -0.153*** -0.101** -0.0777
[0.035] [0.035] [0.034] [0.039] [0.038] [0.050] [0.052]
log(telephone lines) 0.341*** 0.252*** 0.274*** 0.259*** 1.192*** 0.460***
[0.090] [0.092] [0.092] [0.091] [0.18] [0.15]
log(fuel) 0.0513* 0.0734*** 0.0817*** 0.0570** 0.0645** 0.0357
[0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.027] [0.028] [0.069]
Qual. of  Bureaucracy 0.216*** 0.165** 0.155** 0.0266 0.185
[0.074] [0.077] [0.078] [0.10] [0.14]
Executive constraints 0.0316 0.0376 0.0851* -0.152** 0.074
[0.039] [0.041] [0.047] [0.077] [0.064]
Rule of Law  0.0389 0.0343 0.0241 0.349*** -0.0221
[0.040] [0.041] [0.041] [0.063] [0.090]
Overall fin. development -1.105 -1.018 -0.791 0.107
[0.82] [0.82] [1.13] [1.54]
Bank efficiency 4.485*** 3.048** 4.132** 9.180***
[1.49] [1.43] [1.62] [2.47]
Trade liberalization 1.835 5.582* -1.796
[1.47] [2.88] [1.62]
Privatization 1.133*** 1.410*** 1.512***
[0.37] [0.51] [0.47]
Observations 355 315 315 315 298 182 116
Number of ccode 33 33 33 33 31 15 16
Sargan Test 0.55 0.64 0.53 0.66 0.27 0.31 0.18
SOC 0.42 0.46 0.39 0.49 0.21 0.65 0.09
Regressions use the system-GMM estimator. All regressions include a constant term. Robust standard errors are 
reported in brackets. Instruments used are log(GDP), log(GDP per capita), log(inflation), log(telephone lines), 
log(fuel), quality of bureaucracy,  executive constraints, rule of law, overall financial development, bank efficiency, 
trade liberalization, and privatization: for the difference equations, all in lagged levels and,  for the level equation, in 
first difference.  *** , **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,  respectively.   
Dependent variable = log(FDI/GDP)
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Table 2. Determinants of FDI: Decomposition of Financial Liberalization 
 
123456789 1 0
ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL ALL LAC TE
log(GDP) -0.475*** -0.297** -0.417*** -0.393*** -0.432*** -0.615*** -0.356*** -0.335*** -1.489*** -0.486***
[0.13] [0.13] [0.12] [0.12] [0.12] [0.17] [0.12] [0.12] [0.24] [0.19]
log(GDP per capita) 0.445*** 0.407*** 0.428*** 0.416*** 0.366*** 1.622*** 0.343*** 0.363*** -0.239 0.917***
[0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.20] [0.12] [0.12] [0.17] [0.27]
log(inflation) -0.187*** -0.137*** -0.164*** -0.166*** -0.181*** 0.0133 -0.169*** -0.138*** -0.133** -0.0144
[0.036] [0.041] [0.037] [0.038] [0.035] [0.043] [0.036] [0.042] [0.056] [0.051]
log(telephone lines) 0.317** 0.13 0.249** 0.238** 0.253** 0.341** 0.174 0.167 1.524*** 0.124
[0.13] [0.12] [0.11] [0.11] [0.11] [0.16] [0.12] [0.12] [0.26] [0.18]
log(fuel) 0.0893** 0.0849** 0.0639* 0.0734** 0.0439 -0.147** 0.0509 0.0603 0.0179 0.102
[0.037] [0.036] [0.037] [0.037] [0.033] [0.063] [0.039] [0.038] [0.044] [0.092]
Qual. of  Bureaucracy 0.151* 0.133 0.140* 0.178** 0.207*** -0.440*** 0.167** 0.169** -0.0255 -0.106
[0.081] [0.082] [0.081] [0.088] [0.080] [0.13] [0.082] [0.082] [0.12] [0.15]
Executive constraints 0.110** 0.112** 0.0948* 0.101* 0.0661 0.168*** 0.115** 0.0923* -0.173* 0.028
[0.052] [0.052] [0.053] [0.053] [0.053] [0.058] [0.052] [0.053] [0.10] [0.065]
Rule of Law  0.012 -0.00482 0.00198 -0.0163 -0.00574 -0.134* -0.0293 -0.0115 0.320*** 0.0377
[0.044] [0.043] [0.043] [0.048] [0.043] [0.072] [0.046] [0.044] [0.068] [0.091]
Overall fin. development -0.672 -0.94 -1.009 -0.847 0.00603 -4.761*** -1.149 -1.077 0.82 -4.199***
[0.98] [0.97] [0.98] [0.98] [0.98] [1.16] [0.98] [0.98] [1.59] [1.50]
Trade liberalization 1.374 1.665 0.431 0.649 1.284 -3.293** 1.17 0.782 5.182 -4.940***
[1.70] [1.71] [1.77] [1.82] [1.68] [1.67] [1.69] [1.71] [3.86] [1.84]
Privatization 1.010*** 1.056*** 1.067*** 1.089*** 1.004*** 0.675* 1.099*** 1.080*** 1.671*** 1.067**
[0.38] [0.38] [0.38] [0.38] [0.38] [0.40] [0.38] [0.38] [0.54] [0.47]
competition -0.0922
[0.074]
supervision 0.150**
[0.075]
privatization_bank 0.0777
[0.053]
ccontrol 0.0615
[0.074]
capitalflows -0.0741
[0.059]
creditceilings 0.580*
[0.30]
securitiesmarkets 0.152*
[0.079]
Financial liberalization index 0.733* -0.499 2.009***
[0.42] [0.66] [0.62]
Observations 245 245 245 245 253 113 245 245 145 100
Number of ccode 24 24 24 24 25 13 24 24 11 13
Sargan test 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.16
SOC 0.3 0.25 0.29 0.27 0.22 0.26 0.27 0.28 0.5 0.33
Regressions use the system-GMM estimator. All regressions include a constant term. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets. Instruments 
used are log(GDP), log(GDP per capita), log(inflation), log(telephone lines), log(fuel), quality of bureaucracy,  executive constraints, rule of law, 
overall financial development, bank efficiency, trade liberalization, and privatization: for the difference equations, all in lagged levels and,  for the 
level equation, in first difference.  *** , **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,  respectively.   
[Dependent variable = log(FDI/GDP)]
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Table 3. Determinants of FDI: Nonfinancial vs. Financial FDI 
 
NoFinFDI FinFDI NoFinFDI FinFDI NofinFDI finFDI
ALL ALL LAC LAC TE TE
log(GDP) -0.708*** -0.0113 -1.766*** -1.385*** -0.766** -0.524**
[0.18] [0.19] [0.26] [0.30] [0.33] [0.24]
log(GDP per capita) 0.572*** 0.138 -0.728** -0.275 0.0305 1.373***
[0.20] [0.15] [0.30] [0.19] [0.47] [0.33]
log(inflation) -0.157** -0.126** -0.200*** -0.120* 0.0877 0.0271
[0.064] [0.052] [0.071] [0.063] [0.069] [0.066]
log(telephone lines) 0.504*** -0.0721 2.043*** 1.387*** 0.164 0.233
[0.18] [0.18] [0.27] [0.31] [0.28] [0.22]
log(fuel) 0.0745 0.0236 -0.101 0.0174 0.167 0.0243
[0.065] [0.047] [0.069] [0.050] [0.17] [0.11]
Qual. of  Bureaucracy 0.285* 0.103 0.0566 -0.0586 0.223 -0.350**
[0.15] [0.098] [0.17] [0.14] [0.25] [0.16]
Executive constraints 0.0518 0.136* -0.0505 -0.157 -0.0782 0.138
[0.070] [0.081] [0.11] [0.13] [0.099] [0.097]
Rule of Law  -0.125* 0.0109 0.336** 0.363*** 0.312** -0.0953
[0.065] [0.053] [0.13] [0.076] [0.15] [0.10]
Financial liberalization index -0.661 1.708*** -1.039 -0.389 6.598*** 1.818**
[0.81] [0.54] [1.10] [0.81] [1.47] [0.72]
Overall fin. development -1.259 -0.935 -1.786 2.188 1.01 -5.977***
[1.51] [1.35] [1.88] [1.92] [3.70] [1.59]
Trade liberalization -3.16 0.0378 2.866 5.14 0.751 -4.439**
[3.06] [2.00] [7.97] [4.59] [2.78] [2.04]
Privatization 1.930** 1.074** 2.675*** 1.199* 4.740*** 0.865*
[0.82] [0.42] [0.58] [0.63] [1.76] [0.46]
Observations 72 173 36 109 36 64
Number of ccode 17 22 8 11 9 11
Sargan test 0.27 0.5 0.16 0.27 0.08 0.15
S O C 0 . 1 60 . 7 90 . 0 20 . 6 20 . 0 50 . 9 6
[Dependent variable = log(FDI/GDP)]
Regressions use the system-GMM estimator. All regressions include a constant term. Robust standard errors 
are reported in brackets. Instruments used are log(GDP), log(GDP per capita), log(inflation), log(telephone 
lines), log(fuel), quality of bureaucracy,  executive constraints, rule of law, overall financial development, 
bank efficiency, trade liberalization, and privatization: for the difference equations, all in lagged levels and,  
for the level equation, in first difference.  *** , **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,  
respectively. 
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Table 4. Determinants of FDI: Robustness Check —Institutions 
 
123456
log(GDP) -0.398*** -0.394*** -0.324*** -0.502*** -0.539*** -0.523***
[0.093] [0.094] [0.10] [0.088] [0.099] [0.099]
log(GDP per capita) 0.214** 0.268*** 0.390*** 0.464*** 0.273*** 0.427***
[0.084] [0.077] [0.086] [0.074] [0.10] [0.089]
log(inflation) -0.151*** -0.136*** -0.122*** -0.134*** -0.140*** -0.144***
[0.037] [0.037] [0.041] [0.037] [0.036] [0.039]
log(telephone lines) 0.242*** 0.296*** 0.214** 0.326*** 0.336*** 0.301***
[0.088] [0.087] [0.097] [0.085] [0.089] [0.093]
log(fuel) 0.0499* 0.0474* 0.0546* 0.0356 0.0408 0.0463
[0.027] [0.027] [0.029] [0.025] [0.028] [0.031]
Bank efficiency  2.703* 3.712*** 5.676*** 2.497** 2.288* 3.146**
[1.41] [1.41] [1.59] [1.22] [1.23] [1.31]
Trade liberalization 1.741 1.39 0.725 2.582** -0.3 -0.801
[1.48] [1.48] [1.61] [1.09] [1.48] [1.48]
Privatization 1.243*** 1.254*** 1.163*** 0.936*** 1.354*** 1.268***
[0.37] [0.37] [0.39] [0.33] [0.37] [0.39]
Qual. of  Bureaucracy 0.225***
[0.069]
Executive constraints 0.142***
[0.041]
Rule of Law  0.0143
[0.044]
Corruption 0.0345
[0.048]
Political Risk 0.0127
[0.0083]
Durability 0.00586**
[0.0027]
Observations 298 298 298 314 244 244
Number of ccode 31 31 31 35 30 30
Sargan test 0.28 0.31 0.44 0.48 0.34 0.45
SOC 0.16 0.19 0.2 0.78 0.29 0.32
Regressions use the system-GMM estimator. All regressions include a constant term. Robust standard 
errors are reported in brackets. Instruments used are log(GDP), log(GDP per capita), log(inflation), 
log(telephone lines), log(fuel), quality of bureaucracy,  executive constraints, rule of law, overall financial 
development, bank efficiency, trade liberalization, and privatization: for the difference equations, all in 
lagged levels and,  for the level equation, in first difference.  *** , **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level,  respectively. 
[Dependent variable = log(FDI/GDP)]
 
      
  45
Table 5. Determinants of FDI: Robustness Check — Infrastructure 
 
ALL ALL
log(GDP) -0.323*** -0.338***
[0.068] [0.060]
log(GDP per capita) 0.353*** 0.207***
[0.064] [0.078]
log(inflation) -0.114*** -0.109***
[0.024] [0.026]
log(telephone lines) 0.167**
[0.065]
log (computer) 0.224***
[0.050]
log(fuel) 0.0778*** 0.0566**
[0.023] [0.024]
Qual. of  Bureaucracy 0.141*** 0.115**
[0.046] [0.053]
Executive constraints 0.115*** 0.166***
[0.029] [0.045]
Rule of Law  0.00222 -0.00856
[0.024] [0.027]
Bank efficiency 1.997** 1.242
[0.84] [0.88]
Financial liberalization index 0.578** 0.503*
[0.23] [0.27]
Trade liberalization 1.032 0.625
[0.94] [0.97]
Privatization 1.069*** 1.208***
[0.21] [0.22]
Observations 245 210
Number of ccode 24 21
Sargan test 0.22 0.23
SOC 0.29 0.24
Regressions use the system-GMM estimator. All regressions include a constant term. Robust 
standard errors are reported in brackets. Instruments used are log(GDP), log(GDP per capita), 
log(inflation), log(telephone lines), log(fuel), quality of bureaucracy,  executive constraints, 
rule of law, overall financial development, bank efficiency, trade liberalization, and 
privatization: for the difference equations, all in lagged levels and,  for the level equation, in 
first difference.  *** , **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,  
[Dependent variable = log(FDI/GDP)]
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Appendix 1. Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
log(FDI/GDP) 582 -4.73 1.12 -8.3 -2.2
log(GDP) 704 10.62 1.39 8.3 14.2
log(GDP per worker) 704 7.51 1.00 3.4 9.7
log(inflation) 563 2.70 1.65 -3.0 8.9
log(telephone) 638 13.84 1.38 10.6 17.6
log(fuel) 523 1.39 1.94 -4.6 4.5
Executive constraints 543 5.44 1.80 1 7
Qual. of  Bureaucracy 498 1.93 0.86 0 4
Rule of Law  498 3.51 1.19 1 6
Overall fin. development 672 0.52 0.08 0 1
Bank efficiency 672 0.78 0.09 0 1
Trade liberalization 571 0.93 0.07 0 1
Privatization 704 0.05 0.11 0 1
Financial liberalization Index 473 0.58 0.23 0 1
competition 478 2.28 0.97 0 3
supervision 478 1.02 0.90 0 3
privatization_banks 478 1.23 1.18 0 3
securitiesmarkets 478 1.62 1.00 0 3
creditceilings 286 0.81 0.39 0 1
capitalflows 476 1.72 1.06 0 3
creditcontrols 474 1.87 1.00 0 3
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Appendix 2. Data Descriotion and Sources
Variable Definition Source 
log(FDI/GDP) Log of FDI to GDP ratio WEO
log(GDP) Log of GDP WEO
log(GDP per worker) Log of GDP per capita WEO
log(inflation) Log of annual inflation WEO
log(telephone) Log of number of main telephone lines World Development Indicators
log(computer) Log of number of computers  World Development Indicators
log(fuel) Log of fuel exports as % of total exports World Development Indicators
Executive constraints Executive constraints, operational de facto indepndence of chief executives polity IV
Qual. of  Bureaucracy ICRG
Rule of Law  ICRG
Overall fin. development
Bank efficiency Index of bank efficiency based on the ratio of overhead cost to total bank assets and net interest margin Author's calculations
Trade liberalization Arithmetic average of normalized average tariff rate and tariff disperision Author's calculations
Privatization Government's privatization proceeds  Kikeri and Kolo (2005)
Corruption Corruption indicator.  Component of the political risk rating, counting for 6 of the 100 points.   ICRG
Political risk Political risk rating measuring political stability using political and social attributes, from 0 (most risky) to 100 (least risky).  
Composed of 12 weighed variables: government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict, 
external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religion in politics, law and order, ethnic tensions, democratic 
accountability, and bureaucracy quality. 
ICRG
Durability The number of years the dictator is in power polity IV
competition Detragiache and others, forthcoming
supervision Detragiache and others, forthcoming
privatization_bank Detragiache and others, forthcoming
securitiesmarkets Detragiache and others (2007) 
creditceilings Ceilings on expansion of bank credit imposed by the CB; =0 if yes, =1 if no. Detragiache and others (2007) 
capitalflows Capital acocunt restrictions: (i) ex rate unified?, (ii) restrict capital inflow?, (iii) restrict capital outflows? Detragiache and others (2007) 
Financial liberalization index Detragiache and others (2007) 
The extent to which the bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or 
interruptions in government services. 
Privatization of banks or the state involvement in the banking sector; =3(FL) if no state banks exist, =2(LL) if most banks are 
privately owned, =1(PR) if major banks are still state-owned, =0(FR) if major banks arfe all state owned
Policies to enhance banking sector supervision: (i) A country adopted capital adequacy ratio based on Basle standard, (ii) 
banking supervisory agnecy indepndent from executive influence, (iii) does bankinhg supervisory agency conduct effective 
supervisions? , (iv) does supervisory agency cover all financial institutions?
Overall financial development index based on three underlying variables, the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, the ratio of 
private sector credit to GDP, and the ratio of commercial bank assets to the total bank assets 
Author's calculations
Policies to lower banking sector entry barriers: (i) foreign banks allowed to enter?, (ii) new domestic banks allowed to enter? 
(iii) restrictions on branching?, (iv)allow banks to engage in a wide range of activities?
A composite index of financial liberlization using bank entry, credit controls, securities markets, interest rates and bank 
privatization
Policies to develop securities in stock markets: (i) a country took measures to develop securities markets, (ii) stock market 
open to foreigners
Agreggate governance indicator measuring the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. 48 
 
 
Appendix 3  
Correlation matrix 
 
 
 
             |   fdi/gdp fdi/wk    gdp_ppp  gdp_pc inflation telephones  fuel bureac~y   xconst ruleof~w     fd1b       fd2    TradeLib  privat  
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
     fdi/gdp |   1.0000 
      fdi/wk |   0.8048   1.0000 
    gdp_ppp_ |  -0.0898   0.0048   1.0000 
      gdp_pc_|   0.2622   0.5852   0.1506   1.0000 
   inflation |  -0.1222  -0.1001   0.1120  -0.0681   1.0000 
   telephone |  -0.0801  -0.0015   0.9384   0.0771   0.0279   1.0000 
        fuel |   0.0414  -0.0599   0.1476  -0.0765  -0.0481   0.1922   1.0000 
  bureacracy |   0.3672   0.5057   0.1363   0.5564  -0.0063   0.0467  -0.1304   1.0000 
      xconst |   0.2952   0.2810  -0.1871   0.2398  -0.0803  -0.2251  -0.2160   0.4742   1.0000 
   ruleoflaw |   0.2135   0.3965  -0.0713   0.4059  -0.0595  -0.0639  -0.1092   0.3920   0.2140   1.0000 
        fd1b |   0.1158   0.2134   0.0167   0.3136  -0.0709   0.0019  -0.0194   0.2171  -0.1247  -0.0360   1.0000 
         fd2 |   0.1982   0.2359  -0.1302   0.2345  -0.1051  -0.0879  -0.3942   0.1801   0.1294   0.0253   0.0713    1.0000 
    TradeLib |   0.1354   0.1154  -0.1181   0.0299  -0.0630  -0.0927   0.0054  -0.1275  -0.0125  -0.0991   0.0795    0.1318   1.0000 
      privat |   0.2395   0.2334  -0.0477   0.0976  -0.0313  -0.0534  -0.0962   0.2060   0.1481   0.1269   0.0072    0.1454  -0.0048   1.0000 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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